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Sex-selective abortion and the theory of 
identity : The case of India
In this paper I shall inquire into the metaphysical underpinnings 
of the prohibition of prenatal femicide within the Indian cultural 
and legal milieu. Even though I choose Th e Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Act and Th e Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act (amended 
in 2004 as Th e Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act) 
as the commencing points of my study, I will develop neither legal 
nor anthropological analysis of the sex-selective abortion in India. 
My purpose is to present politico-philosophical implications of the 
legal solutions in question.
Th e main thesis of my paper is the contention that metaphysical 
background theories that the prohibition of prenatal femicide is based 
on undermine the anti-discriminatory objectives of this prohibition; 
what follows, this anti-discriminatory legislation is then a contradic-
tion in terms and for that reason ought to be abandoned. Th e method 
I deploy in my paper is the so-called method of refl exive equilibrium1 
1 On the method of refl exive equilibrium see: N. Daniels, Wide Refl exive Equi-
librium and Th eory Acceptance in Ethics, „Th e Journal of Philosophy” 1979, Vol. 
76, No. 5; D.W. Haslett , What Is Wrong With Refl exive Equilibria?, „Philosophical 
Quarterly” 1987, No. 37/148; J. Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 
„Th e Philosophical Review” 1951, Vol. 60, No. 2; J.D. Arras, Th e Way We Reason 
Now: Refl exive Equilibrium in Bioethics, [in:] Th e Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, 
B. Steinbock (ed.), New York 2007; N. Daniels, Refl exive Equilibrium, [in:] Th e 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011; J. Rawls, A Th eory of Justice, 
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that examines the logical relations between particular political and 
legal solutions or considered judgements on the one hand and back-
ground theories that constitute Bedingung der Möglichkeit of these 
solutions on the other. Both, the subject-matt er of this paper and 
methods employed demonstrate that the study I present here places 
itself unequivocally within the purview of political philosophy.
Indian law: MTP Act, PCPNDT Act
In India until 1971 Th e Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act abor-
tion was illegal except in the case of saving a mother’s life. Th e MTP 
Act changed the situation considerably making abortion available 
to women in many circumstances, especially “Where any pregnancy 
occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any mar-
ried woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number 
of children, the anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may 
be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the 
pregnant woman2”. Th is created the situation where a married woman 
can terminate her pregnancy almost on demand and for any reason 
provided she is able to convince “a registered medical practitioner 
(specialised in gynaecology or obstetrics, not in psychiatry – LD), 
where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twelve weeks,3” 
and “two registered medical practitioners, where the length of the 
pregnancy exceeds twelve weeks but does not exceed twenty weeks,4” 
Cambridge 1971; R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London 2013; L. Dominiak, 
Metoda równowagi refl eksyjnej (refl exive equilibrium) w fi lozofi i polityki [Th e Method 
of Refl exive Equilibrium in Political Philosophy], „Athenaeum. Polskie Studia 
Politologiczne” 2012, No. 36, p. 143 – 156.
2 Th e Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, Act No. 34 of 1971, Explana-
tion 2., section 3.
3 Ibidem, sub-section 2a, section 3.
4 Ibidem, sub-section 2b, section 3.
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that the pregnancy ensued as the result of contraception failure and 
can be of a detrimental eff ect to the woman’s mental health.
In about 1990 the rapid spread of diagnostic methods that could 
determine the sex of the future child prenatally or even before con-
ception, together with the negative cultural att itude towards women 
and the availability of legal abortion created by the MTP Act, made 
it possible to selectively terminate pregnancies where the gender of 
a foetus was culturally undesired. To counteract this practice and the 
tendency of growing inequality in the child sex ratio, India enacted 
Th e Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act (later amended as Th e Pre-
Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques Act) which was “An 
Act to provide for the prohibition of sex selection, before or aft er 
conception, and for regulation of pre-natal diagnostic techniques 
for the purposes of detecting genetic abnormalities or metabolic 
disorders or chromosomal abnormalities or certain congenital mal-
formations or sex-linked disorders and for the prevention of their 
misuse for sex determination leading to female foeticide; and, for 
matt ers connected therewith or incidental thereto5”. According 
to the PCPNDT Act “No person, including a specialist or a team 
of specialists in the fi eld of infertility, shall conduct or cause to be 
conducted or aid in conducting by himself or by any other person, 
sex selection on a woman or a man or on both or on any tissue, 
embryo, conceptus, fl uid or gametes derived from either or both of 
them6”. Th ese legislative changes created the situation in which it is 
legal to terminate pregnancy under manifold conditions but gender 
selection. Obviously, the purpose of the PCPNDT Act was to pre-
vent and counteract the bias against females present in the Indian 
society and to do so within the context of liberal abortion legislation 
5 Th e Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, 
Act No. 57 of 1994.
6 Ibidem, section 3A, chapter II.
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introduced by the MTP Act. Unfortunately, this kill-two-birds-
with-one-stone kind of policy generated some severe philosophical 
complications that I will ponder on in what follows.
Background theories and prenatal femicide prohibition
I would like to start with a remark that everything I will say in the 
remainder of this paper pertains only to the positions that would like 
to protect women’s right to abortion by and large on demand and at 
the same time prevent prenatal and preconception femicide on the 
grounds that it is an instance of gender discrimination or violation 
of women’s rights; for the proponent of the belief that the foetus is 
a human person from the moment of conception and that abortion is 
more or less tantamount to murder, nothing of what follows creates 
problems.
Th ere are several possible justifi cations of the prohibition of 
prenatal femicide or, generally, prenatal or preconception sex se-
lection in the context of the liberal abortion law. I believe that the 
most infl uential of them is the idea that prenatal femicide is an act 
of discrimination against women or an infringement on women’s 
rights, supposedly, especially the right to equal treatment and recogni-
tion. So, ubiquitous moral intuition or common considered moral 
judgement says that aborting only female foetuses would be an act 
of gender discrimination. Let’s for the sake of simplicity, call this 
considered moral judgement the anti-discriminatory judgement (and 
in its other rights-based version: the equal rights judgement). What 
the anti-discriminatory judgement tells us about the nature of the 
foetus? In other words, what kind of entity must the foetus be for 
the anti-discriminatory judgement to hold?
Th ese questions are in fact inquiries about the background 
theory of the anti-discriminatory judgement, particularly about the 
theory of identity and theory of the person that is presupposed by 
208 Łukasz Dominiak 
the anti-discriminatory judgement or that can be reconciled with 
this judgement. I think that one can distinguish between two gen-
eral sets of background theories that are pertinent to the issues in 
question. 1) Th e fi rst group consists of various theories of identity 
that in various capacities hold that there is a relation of identity 
between the foetus7 and the future child and so on. Let’s elaborate 
on some of them. One of the most radical theories and partly apt 
in this case is Th e Same Genotype Account. According to this sort of 
theory of identity a person P1 at time t1 and a person P2 at time t2 
are the same person if and only if they have the same genotype. Th is 
criterion can of course be enriched by diff erent interpretations, for 
instance it can utilise discoveries of epigenetics. It is a no-brainer 
to notice that Th e Same Genotype Account equilibrates (is in a state 
of refl exive equilibrium) with the anti-discriminatory judgement as 
far as the prenatal sex selection is concerned. To put it simply, it is 
a foetus that has two chromosomes XX that is discriminated against 
by prenatal femicide.
Another theory of identity that fully equilibrates with the anti-
discriminatory judgement is Th e Same Soul Account. According to this 
Cartesian theory of identity we are essentially immaterial souls. If one 
connects this belief with the statement that ensoulment occurs at the 
moment of conception, it works perfectly with the prenatal version of 
the anti-discriminatory judgement; but of course it is not necessary 
to limit one’s imagination by stopping at the moment of conception. 
What is important about the Cartesian Same Soul Account is the fact 
that since the soul is an immaterial, spiritual entity, this account can 
be reconciled with an almost infi nite number of moral judgements 
and fancy scenarios. Th ere is nothing there in the Cartesian concept 
of the soul that could for instance impede soul’s ability to occupy two 
7 When in this paper I talk about the foetus I mean also the zygote and all 
subsequent developmental stages. From time to time, to underline some important 
diff erences between theories I use the term „early foetus”.
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diff erent bodies or a sperm and an ovum simultaneously; it makes 
room even for the concept of reincarnation8. For that reason Th e 
Same Soul Account can equilibrate well with the anti-discriminatory 
judgement even as far as it pertains to preconception sex-selection 
procedures. It of course does not mean that Th e Same Soul Account 
does not suff er from other maladies.
2) Th e second group of background theories comprises on the 
one hand theories of identity that deny early foetuses the status of 
a human being and theories that abstract from the question of identity 
or negate the very category of identity on the other. Amongst the fi rst 
group there are theories of identity that work with the anti-discrimi-
natory judgement only as far as late abortion is concerned. Amongst 
them one can mention Th e Same Substance Account. According to this 
hylomorphic theory represented by Aristotle and Aquinas we are 
essentially substances that consist of the soul (form) and the body 
(matt er) and since our specifi cally human form ensues from some 
previous organic development taking place prenatally, we become 
human beings only at some time aft er conception9. Similar conse-
quences for the anti-discriminatory judgement yields McMahan’s 
Th e Embodied Mind Account which by and large assumes that for the 
relation of personal identity to hold there must be enough parts of 
the same brain to maintain the capacity for consciousness10; what 
unambiguously follows from this statement is the assertion that early 
foetus and the future child are not one and the same entity.
Th e second kind of theory within this group is the theory that 
negates the very category of identity. Th e most famous of them is the 
theory of Derek Parfi t according to which identity is not what matt ers. 
8 For a more detailed analysis of the Cartesian soul see: J. McMahan, Th e Ethics 
of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life, New York 2002, p. 9 – 10, 14 – 19, passim.
9 St. Th . Aquinas, Summa Th eologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, 1947, I, q. 76 a. 3 ad , a. 5; q. 118 a. 2 ad 2.
10 See J. McMahan, op.cit., p. 66 – 94.
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Although Parfi t starts with Th e Psychological Account which should be 
qualifi ed as lying within the previous group (the early foetus and the 
future child are not the same entity since they are not psychologically 
continuous with each other; according to Th e Psychological Account 
a person P1 at time t1 and a person P2 at time t2 are the same person 
if and only if P2 is psychologically continuous with P1) he ends 
with the thesis of the unimportance of identity and with the support 
for impersonal ethics11. Another example of this kind of theory is 
Th e Interest View represented by Bonnie Steinbock (I believe that on 
a deep level Th e Interest View is the theory of the above-mentioned 
type that implicitly employs the concept of identity; it basically denies 
early foetus the status of a human being). It says that what matt ers 
are the interests of particular persons (“without conscious aware-
ness, beings cannot have interests”12) and that outside the realm of 
conscious awareness these interests are operative not on the basis of 
the theory of identity but on the basis of the concept of causality. To 
put it simply, an injury infl icted upon a preconscious foetus that does 
not have interests yet should be recognised as harm and should be 
recovered “assuming that causation could be established”13 between 
the injury and the future disability of the future child.
The anti-discriminatory judgement and the nature 
of the foetus
So, to come back to my main question: What the anti-discrimi-
natory judgement tells us about the nature of the foetus? In other 
words, what kind of entity must the foetus be for anti-discriminato-
11 See D. Parfi t, Reasons and Persons, New York 1987.
12 B. Steinbock, Life Before Birth. Th e Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and 
Fetuses, New York 2011, p. XIV.
13 Ibidem, p. 112.
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ry judgement to hold? Th e most rudimentary metaphysical scrutiny 
informs us that for the prenatal and preconception femicide to be 
an act of discrimination and/or violation of rights there has to be 
somebody who is discriminated against and/or whose rights are 
violated. If particular sex-selective abortion is a  discrimination 
against particular woman, there must be some being there that is 
identical with the woman that is discriminated against. Since you 
cannot violate the rights of somebody who does not exist the same 
as you cannot discriminate against somebody who does not exist, 
it must mean that if prenatal femicide is a discrimination against 
women and a violation of women’s rights, a foetus who is killed in 
this procedure must be this woman who is discriminated against 
and whose rights are violated in an act of prenatal femicide; and 
if this foetus is this woman, it is as well and by defi nition a human 
being (since every woman is a human being), the same entity as 
you and me and the same entity as the future counterfactual woman 
who would have been existed if prenatal femicide had not been per-
formed on this foetus.
To put it in a more analytical way consider the following line of 
argument:
1. For an act to be a discrimination/violation of rights there must 
be somebody who is discriminated against/whose rights are 
violated. A contrario, one cannot discriminate against nobody, 
non-existent entity/violate rights of nobody, non-existent 
entity.
2. Since prenatal femicide is both performed on a foetus and 
deemed an act of discrimination against women/violation 
of women’s rights, the foetus that is killed in this procedure 
must be a woman.
3. Since every woman (and every man – but it was not the subject 
of my line of reasoning here, though it is a tacit premise of it) 
is a human being,
4. CONCLUSION: every foetus is a human being.
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Is there any problem with this conclusion for the proponents of the 
anti-discriminatory judgement? Unfortunately, this conclusion yields 
undesirable consequences for the justifi cation of women’s rights to 
abortion. If the foetus is the same entity as you and me, killing it is far 
more diffi  cult to justify than if it had some lower status, for instance, 
a status of the clump of cells or of the potential human being. Th e 
case for women’s right to abortion is based on two main arguments 
that work together: 1) that woman has a right to decide about her 
own body and her family life; 2) that foetus at the early stages of 
pregnancy is not a human being yet, even though it has some potential 
to develop into a human being. Th ose arguments work together in 
most legislations and philosophical discussions in such a way that 
the stronger is the latt er, the weaker is the former. Th e right to decide 
about one’s own body loses strength with time for two reasons: 1) 
the postponement of the decision is diffi  cult to make sense of; 2) the 
older the foetus, the less and less the decision is about one’s own body 
and more and more about someone else’s life and death. Th e right to 
decide about the shape of one’s family life is not absolute and cannot 
be the reason to unprovoked or infringe on someone else’s liberty and 
rights. Hence, weakening the claim that the foetus at the early stages 
of pregnancy is not a human being means weakening the impact of 
the claim that the woman has a right to decide about her own body 
and her family life (since the more a woman has this right, the lower 
the status of the foetus must be); in consequence it means weakening 
the whole case for a women’s right to abortion. In the Indian context 
it of course means weakening the solutions introduced in 1971 by the 
MTP Act. So, it is glaringly inconsistent to grant women the right to 
abort the foetus for, amongst others, negligible reasons (for example, 
contraception failure) and yet to prevent abortions for reasons of sex 
selection as acts of discrimination against women. Since to constrain 
women’s rights to abortion is commonly viewed as the discriminatory 
practice (men can decide about their own bodies whereas women 
cannot enjoy this right) and since bestowing the status of human 
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being on the foetus weakens the case for women’s rights to abortion, 
then prohibition of prenatal femicide creates rather than limits gender 
discrimination (in the remainder I will analyse other reasons why 
prohibition of prenatal femicide creates gender discrimination).
If we look at the scope of the prohibition in question and realise 
that it pertains to both prenatal (from the moment of conception) 
and preconception procedures, we will understand that the theory 
of identity that makes sense of our conclusion from that point 4. that 
every foetus is a human being, must be either some variation on Th e 
Same Genotype Account or some version of Th e Same Soul Account, 
with the preference for the latt er. But both of these theories provide 
quite strong defence of the foetus as a fully-fl edged moral subject. 
If we essentially are souls then the developmental stage of our body 
is of no importance whatsoever for our status. If on the other hand 
we essentially are our genotypes then aft er conception there is no 
signifi cant change in our status, only adventitious transitions in our 
bodies. Particularly Th e Same Soul Account can be apt in the Indian 
context since it makes room for the idea of reincarnation and the 
principle of non-injury/non-violence (ahimsa). But both of these 
theories of identity provide strong justifi cation for the protection of 
foetal life and weaken the case for women’s right to abortion.
It is possible however to try to explain the anti-discriminatory 
judgement in another way, by the reference to the second group of 
background theories according to which either early foetus is not 
a human being or identity is not what matt ers. Let’s start with the fi rst 
option. Since, as I have already noticed, for an act to be an instance 
of discrimination there must be some being that is discriminated 
against, these background theories must somehow explain how it is 
possible that it is not the foetus that is discriminated against but some 
other entity. Th e most straightforward att empt to do it was made by 
Th e Interest View (which although is classifi ed by me as an instance of 
the theory for which identity is not what matt ers, on a deep level is an 
instance of the theory which basically denies early foetus the status 
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of a human being) within the context of prenatal and preconception 
harm14. According to Th e Interest View a recognition of the right of 
a child to recover from injuries infl icted prenatally and before con-
ception can generate apparent inconsistency with the abortion law 
and the status of the foetus within the abortion law. At fi rst glance, 
prenatal and preconception lawsuits assume that the foetus is the 
same being as the future child whereas abortion law is based on the 
assumption that early foetus is not a human being. But it does not 
have to be so. Th ere is another possible interpretation that avoids this 
inconsistency. As Bonnie Steinbock wrote: “Th e interest view denies 
moral and legal status to the early-gestation foetus, providing part of 
the justifi cation for legal abortion. However, acceptance of the inter-
est view does not preclude prenatal torts, that is, civil suits brought 
against physicians whose negligence causes children to be born with 
serious injuries. Although the harm is infl icted prenatally, when the 
child is a foetus, it is not the foetus, but surviving child, who is af-
fected and wronged by the negligence. Allowing surviving children 
to recover for injuries infl icted prior to birth in no way implies that 
preconscious foetuses have interests, rights, or moral or legal status. 
Th ere is no contradiction in the legal system that both allows for 
abortion and allows recovery for prenatal torts”15. So, following this 
logic one could say that it is not the foetus who is discriminated 
against and whose rights are violated by the act of prenatal and pre-
conception femicide but a woman who cannot be born and cannot 
live because of the sex-selective abortion. Unfortunately, this strategy 
would not work. Th e diff erence between the concept of prenatal/
preconception harm and prenatal/preconception sex selection is 
that in the fi rst case there is a surviving child whereas in the second 
14 Ł. Dominiak, Prenatal Harm and Th eory of Identity, „Political Dialogues. 
Journal of Biopolitics and Contemporary Political Th eories” 2013, No. 1(15), 
p. 46 – 52.
15 Ibidem, p. 109.
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case there is nobody; and nobody cannot have rights and cannot be 
discriminated against. Th e analogy that holds in the case of prenatal 
femicide is not with the prenatal harm but with the wrongful death 
lawsuits where parents recover from the death of their child, not the 
non-existent child itself. So, perhaps there is some other strategy 
that is able to explain how it is possible that it is not the foetus that 
is discriminated against but some other entity? I believe that this 
kind of explanation is impossible because both the concept of rights 
and the concept of discrimination are based on the assumption that 
there is somebody who is the addressee of rights or discriminatory 
actions16.
Th ere is fi nally the last option to consider, namely theories that 
negate the importance of the category of personal identity. Accord-
ing to these theories it might be possible to show that even though 
sex selection does not violates anybody’s rights understood as they 
are in our society, it is feasible either to re-defi ne concepts of right 
and discrimination in such a way as to prove that preconception and 
prenatal sex selection violates rights and discriminates on a gender 
basis or to explain the evil of preconception and prenatal sex selec-
tion in impersonal terms, for instance by modifying Derek Parfi t’s 
Th e Same Number Quality Claim17 in such a way (Let’s call it Th e 
Equal Sex Ratio Claim): “If in either of two possible outcomes the 
same number of people would ever live, it would be worse of if those 
who live are of a more unequal sex ratio, than those who would have 
lived”. Since this paper is not about the drawbacks of impersonal 
ethics that, I believe, are manifold and gargantuan (I believe that 
16 Th ere is some interesting consequence of the analysis presented so far. If 
preconception and prenatal sex selection cannot be an act of gender discrimination 
and rights violation because early foetus is not a human being, and since in Indian 
society women are commonly discriminated against, these procedures, namely 
preconception and prenatal sex selection, can be viewed not as discriminatory 
practices but as preventive measures against gender discrimination.
17 D. Parfi t, op.cit., p. 360.
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any possible solution within the remit of impersonal ethics would 
necessarily violate individual liberty and property rights), and since 
to discuss them even superfi cially would take another few papers, 
I will constrain myself only to one argument directed against Th e 
Equal Sex Ratio Claim.
Let’s analyse what Th e Equal Sex Ratio Claim tells us about the 
acceptability of sex-selective methods. Th ere are two logically pos-
sible and equally justifi ed answers to this question. Th e fi rst of them 
is that since it is solely the outcome expressed in impersonal terms 
that counts and since the desirable outcome is to have the most equal 
sex ratio, we should avoid any sex-selective methods. Th e second is 
that since it is solely the outcome expressed in impersonal terms that 
counts and since the desirable outcome is to have the most equal sex 
ratio, we should employ sex-selective methods. None of these answers 
is bett er than the other. If the outcome is what exclusively counts, 
and if there are less women in a given society (or in the world) than 
men, then we can reach this outcome either by lett ing girls be born 
(resigning from sex-selective methods) or by killing male foetuses 
(using sex-selective methods). So, Th e Equal Sex Ratio Claim does not 
and cannot provide justifi cation for the prohibition of sex-selective 
methods. It is rather live-by-the-sword-die-by-the-sword kind of 
explanatory strategy.
Conclusions
In this paper I analysed implications that the prohibition of precon-
ception and prenatal sex-selective methods has for women’s right to 
abortion and for the proponents of the position that women should 
enjoy extensive freedom in this area. Th ese implications are:
1) Prohibition of preconception and prenatal sex selection 
presupposes that the foetus is a human being who has rights 
217Sex-selective abortion and the theory of identity
and who can be discriminated against and whose rights can 
be violated.
2) To bestow the status of a human being on the foetus weakens 
the case for women’s right to abortion.
3) Weakening the case for women’s right to abortion is viewed 
by the proponents of gender equality as discrimination (men 
can decide about their bodies, women cannot). So, prohibition 
of preconception and prenatal sex selection is discriminatory 
a solution.
4) Th ere is another position that explicitly denies the status of 
a human being to the early foetus; from the vantage point 
of this position it is true that: if preconception and prena-
tal sex selection is not an act of gender discrimination and 
rights violation because early foetus is not a human being, 
and since in some societies women are discriminated against, 
preconception and prenatal sex selection in such societies are 
not discriminatory practices but preventive measures against 
gender discrimination.
5) Th ere is fi nally another position that explicitly criticises the 
category of personal identity; from the vantage point of this 
position it is true that: if the outcome is what exclusively 
counts, and if there are less women in a given society (or in 
the world) than men (or the other way around), then we can 
reach this outcome either by lett ing girls be born or by killing 
male foetuses (or the other way around).
6) For any possible position diff erent than the pro-life position 
the prohibition of preconception and prenatal sex-selective 
methods that are used before the time when the foetus be-
comes a being that is identical with the future being that is 
regarded as human being would mean an infringement on 
individual rights and liberty.
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Abstract
Th e paper analyses by the method of refl exive equilibrium background 
theories of the prohibition of preconception and prenatal sex-selective 
procedures in India. Particularly, the inquiry focuses on the theory of 
identity presupposed by the legal solutions. Th e main thesis of the paper is 
the contention that metaphysical background theories that the prohibition 
of prenatal femicide is based on undermining the anti-discriminatory 
objectives of this prohibition. Th e paper demonstrates that prohibition 
of preconception and prenatal sex selection presupposes that the foetus 
is a human being who has rights and who can be discriminated against 
and whose rights can be violated that considerably weakens the case for 
women’s right to abortion.
Keywords: prenatal sex-selective methods, femicide, gendercide, abor-
tion, Indian law, theory of identity
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